Post-quantum signature schemes for blockchains

Blockchains can move to post-quantum signatures with ML-DSA or SLH-DSA, the two schemes NIST finalized on August 13, 2024 in FIPS 204 and FIPS 205, or with Falcon once NIST finishes its standard. The smallest ML-DSA signature runs to 2,420 bytes against 64 bytes for a Bitcoin Schnorr signature, so the choice comes down to signature size and the state a signer has to keep. A hybrid signature keeps the chain’s existing algorithm in place and adds the post-quantum one next to it, so a weakness in the new scheme leaves you with today’s security.

NIST runs its post-quantum cryptography project because quantum computers, which may be years or decades away, could eventually break many of the cryptographic systems in wide use today.

Key and signature sizes

SchemeBuilt onStatusPublic key (bytes)Signature (bytes)
BIP-340 Schnorr, the classical baselineElliptic curveBitcoin BIP-3403264
ML-DSA-44Module latticesFIPS 204, final1,3122,420
ML-DSA-65Module latticesFIPS 204, final1,9523,309
Falcon-512LatticesStandardization underway897666
SLH-DSA-128sHash functions, statelessFIPS 205, final327,856
SLH-DSA-128fHash functions, statelessFIPS 205, final3217,088
LMS and XMSSHash functions, statefulSP 800-208, finalDepends on parameter setDepends on parameter set

The sizes come from Table 2 of FIPS 204, Table 2 of FIPS 205, the Falcon site and BIP-340. NIST places ML-DSA-44 in security category 2 and both SLH-DSA-128 sets in category 1, so the rows do not all target the same strength.

  • Falcon-512 gives the smallest post-quantum signature in the table, at 666 bytes. NIST selected Falcon but has not finalized its standard, and the pqhybridsign README lists this as a limitation. Expect to revisit Falcon code once NIST publishes the final version.
  • SLH-DSA uses a 32-byte public key, the size of a BIP-340 key, but its signatures start at 7,856 bytes. FIPS 205 derives it from SPHINCS+, so its security rests on hash functions alone.
  • ML-DSA is the finalized lattice option. At its smallest parameter set, an ML-DSA signature is larger than Falcon’s and far smaller than SLH-DSA’s.

Stateful schemes count every signature

SP 800-208 specifies LMS and XMSS, two stateful hash-based schemes, along with their multi-tree variants. Each private key in these schemes covers a fixed supply of one-time keys, and RFC 8554 forbids signing a second message with a one-time key after it has signed the first.

A signer using LMS or XMSS therefore marks each one-time key as spent, and writes the mark before broadcasting the transaction. When a user restores a wallet from an old backup, the signer loses track of keys spent since the backup and can sign with one of them again.

Hybrid signatures

A hybrid signature pairs a classical signature with a post-quantum one. Verifiers accept the pair only if both halves verify. According to the pqhybridsign README, the composite stays unforgeable while either half survives a break, so in the worst case you fall back to the security of the classical algorithm you already use.

Quip Network’s open-source library pqhybridsign is a hybrid classical and post-quantum suite written in Rust, with C, Python and WebAssembly bindings. It pairs ed25519 or sr25519 with one of three post-quantum schemes:

  • ML-DSA-44, the FIPS 204 lattice scheme.
  • Falcon-512 (FN-DSA-512), the other lattice option, built on the fn-dsa crate ahead of a final FIPS 206.
  • SHRINCS, a stateful hash-based scheme.

The library’s verifier evaluates both halves on every call, even after the first half fails. Composite sizes add up from the halves. An ed25519 and ML-DSA-44 composite carries a 1,344-byte public key and a 2,484-byte signature, 64 bytes more than ML-DSA-44 alone.

Hybrid signing in Quip Accounts

A Quip Account holds assets in a smart contract on the chain you already use. Every Quip signature wraps the chain’s existing algorithm with a post-quantum one. On EVM chains, the account contract gates each owner operation behind both the owner’s ECDSA key and a SHRINCS signature, so an attacker has to break both to move funds.

SHRINCS is the two-path hash-based construction described by Kudinov and Nick in ePrint 2025/2203. Quip implements it in its hashsigs-rs library, and pqhybridsign pairs the same scheme with ed25519 or sr25519 in its stateful suites. SHRINCS gives each account two signing paths:

  1. An everyday path, where each signature consumes one slot from a fixed budget.
  2. A break-glass path for recovery, including rotation to a fresh key bundle, with more expensive signatures and no need for a record of used slots.

The Quip clients track slots for account holders. A team writing its own signer with @quip.network/hashsigs-wasm keeps that record itself, under the same rule as LMS and XMSS.

For a Substrate-based chain, a post on the Quip research forum compares liboqs, pqcrypto and other libraries for these schemes.

Next step

Read Quip Accounts before you add post-quantum signing to a wallet or contract. It covers slot tracking, ERC-1271 signature checks and account upgrades.

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